Obligation Qatar 3.4% ( XS2155352151 ) en USD

Qatar

100 % ▼

Qatar

XS2155352151 ( en USD )

3.4% par an ( paiement semestriel )

15/04/2025 - Obligation échue

Prospectus brochure de l'obligation Qatar XS2155352151 en USD 3.4%, échue

200 000 USD

2 000 000 000 USD

Le Qatar est un petit État souverain de la péninsule arabique, riche en gaz naturel et connu pour sa capitale, Doha, son organisation de la Coupe du monde de football 2022 et son influence géopolitique croissante.

L'Obligation émise par Qatar ( Qatar ) , en USD, avec le code ISIN XS2155352151, paye un coupon de 3.4% par an.
Le paiement des coupons est semestriel et la maturité de l'Obligation est le 15/04/2025

The State of Qatar
U.S.$2,000,000,000 3.400% Bonds due 2025
Issue Price: 99.690%
U.S.$3,000,000,000 3.750% Bonds due 2030
Issue Price: 99.810%
U.S.$5,000,000,000 4.400% Bonds due 2050
Issue Price: 100.000%
The U.S.$2,000,000,000 3.400% Bonds due 2025 (the "2025 Bonds"), the U.S.$3,000,000,000 3.750% Bonds due 2030 (the "2030 Bonds") and the
U.S.$5,000,000,000 4.400% Bonds due 2050 (the "2050 Bonds" and, together with the 2025 Bonds and the 2030 Bonds, the "Bonds") are being offered
inside the United States to qualified institutional buyers in reliance on Rule 144A under the United States Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").
In addition, the Bonds are being offered outside the United States in reliance on Regulation S under the Securities Act.
The State of Qatar, acting through the Ministry of Finance ("Qatar" or the "State"), will pay interest on each 2025 Bond at the rate of 3.400% per annum
from and including April 16, 2020 semi-annually in arrear on April 16 and October 16 in each year until (and including) April 16, 2025 (the "2025
Maturity Date"), commencing on October 16, 2020. The State will pay interest on each 2030 Bond at the rate of 3.750% per annum from and including
April 16, 2020 semi-annually in arrear on April 16 and October 16 in each year until (and including) April 16, 2030 (the "2030 Maturity Date"),
commencing on October 16, 2020. The State will pay interest on each 2050 Bond at the rate of 4.400% per annum from and including April 16, 2020
semi-annually in arrear on April 16 and October 16 in each year until (and including) April 16, 2050 (the "2050 Maturity Date" and, together with the
2025 Maturity Date and the 2030 Maturity Date, the "Maturity Dates"), commencing on October 16, 2020.
Unless previously redeemed or purchased and cancelled, each series of Bonds will be redeemed at its principal amount together with accrued interest on
the Maturity Date applicable to the relevant series of Bonds. The State may redeem any series of Bonds, in whole or in part, at any time at a redemption
price equal to the greater of (a) 100% of the principal amount of the relevant series of Bonds plus accrued and unpaid interest and (b) the relevant Make-
Whole Amount (as defined in the Terms and Conditions of the Bonds).
Except as set forth herein, payments in respect of the Bonds will be made without any deduction or withholding for or on account of taxes of Qatar or any
political subdivision thereof or any authority therein or thereof having power to tax.
An investment in the Bonds involves certain risks. Prospective investors should review the factors described under "Risk Factors" in this
Prospectus.
Application has been made to the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (the "CSSF"), as competent
authority under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (the "Prospectus Regulation") and the Luxembourg law of July 16, 2019 on prospectuses for
securities, as amended (the "Prospectus Law 2019") to approve this document as a prospectus within the meaning of the Prospectus Regulation.
Application has been made to the Luxembourg Stock Exchange for the Bonds to be admitted to trading on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange's regulated
market and to be listed on the official list of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. The Luxembourg Stock Exchange's regulated market is a regulated market
for purposes of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, "MiFID II"). The CSSF assumes no responsibility as to the economic and financial soundness of the
Bonds and the quality or solvency of the State pursuant to provisions of the Prospectus Law 2019. The CSSF only approves this Prospectus (as defined
below) as meeting the standards of completeness, comprehensibility and consistency imposed by the Prospectus Regulation. Approval by the CSSF
should not be considered as an endorsement of the State. By approving this Prospectus, the CSSF assumes no responsibility as to the economic and
financial soundness of the transactions contemplated by this Prospectus or the quality or solvency of the State in accordance with the Prospectus Law
2019. This Prospectus shall be valid for 12 months after such approval. The obligation to supplement this Prospectus in the event of significant new
factors, material mistakes or material inaccuracies does not apply when this Prospectus is no longer valid.
Application will be made to the Taipei Exchange ("TPEx") for the listing of, and permission to sell or resell, the 2050 Bonds to "professional investors"
as defined under Paragraph 1 of Article 2-1 of the Taipei Exchange Rules Governing Management of Foreign Currency Denominated International Bonds
of the Republic of China (the "TPEx Rules") only and such permission is expected to become effective on or about April 16, 2020. No assurance can be
given that such application will be approved, or that the TPEx listing will be maintained.
Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, Taipei Branch, Deutsche Bank AG, Taipei Branch and Standard Chartered Bank (Taiwan) Limited
(together, the "2050 Bonds Joint Bookrunning Managers") will offer and sell the 2050 Bonds in the Republic of China (the "ROC" or "Taiwan").
None of Barclays Bank PLC, J.P. Morgan Securities plc, QNG Capital LLC or UBS AG London Branch (together, the "2050 Bonds Structuring
Agents") is licensed in Taiwan and, accordingly, none of the 2050 Bonds Structuring Agents has offered or sold, or will subscribe for or sell or
underwrite, any of the 2050 Bonds offered, sold or re-sold hereby.
No application is being made to the TPEx for the listing of the 2025 Bonds or the 2030 Bonds.
The TPEx is not responsible for the content of this Prospectus (as defined below) and/or any supplement or amendment thereto and no representation is
made by the TPEx as to the accuracy or completeness of this Prospectus and/or any supplement or amendment thereto. The TPEx expressly disclaim any
and all liability for any losses arising from, or as a result of the reliance on, all or part of the contents of this Prospectus and/or any supplement or
amendment thereto. The admission to the listing and trading of the 2050 Bonds on the TPEx shall not be taken as an indication of the merits of the State
or the 2050 Bonds.
Qatar has been assigned a long-term credit rating of "AA-" with a stable outlook by S&P Global Ratings, a division of S&P Global Inc. ("S&P"), of
"AA-" with a stable outlook by Fitch Ratings, Ltd. ("Fitch"), and of "Aa3" with a stable outlook by Moody's Investors Service, Inc., a subsidiary of
Moody's Corporation ("Moody's").

It is expected that the Bonds will be rated "AA-" by S&P, "AA-" by Fitch and "Aa3" by Moody's. A rating is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold
securities and may be subject to revision, suspension or withdrawal at any time by the assigning rating organization. The credit ratings included or referred

to in this prospectus (the "Prospectus") will be treated for the purposes of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies, as amended by
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 (the "CRA Regulation") as having been issued by S&P, Fitch and Moody's. Each of S&P, Fitch and Moody's is
established in the European Union and is registered under the CRA Regulation. Each of these agencies is included in the list of credit rating agencies
published by the European Securities and Markets Authority on its website (http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/List-registered-and-certified-CRAs) in
accordance with the CRA Regulation. Any change in the rating of the Bonds may adversely affect the price that a purchaser may be willing to pay for the
Bonds.
The Bonds have not been and will not be registered under the Securities Act and are being offered and sold in the United States only to qualified
institutional buyers in reliance on Rule 144A under the Securities Act. Prospective purchasers that are qualified institutional buyers in the
United States are hereby notified that the seller of the Bonds may be relying on the exemption from the provisions of Section 5 of the Securities
Act provided by Rule 144A. Bonds sold to purchasers in the United States are not transferable except in accordance with the restrictions
described under "Transfer Restrictions".
The Bonds will be offered and sold in registered form in denominations of U.S.$200,000 or any amount in excess thereof which is an integral multiple of
U.S.$1,000. Bonds which are offered and sold in transactions outside the United States in compliance with Regulation S (the "Unrestricted Bonds") will
initially be represented by beneficial interests in a global Bond for each series of Bonds (the "Unrestricted Global Bonds"), in registered form, without
interest coupons attached, which will be registered in the name of a nominee for, and shall be deposited on or about April 16, 2020 (the "Closing Date")
with, a common depositary for, and in respect of interests held through, Euroclear Bank SA/NV ("Euroclear") and Clearstream Banking, S.A.
("Clearstream, Luxembourg"). Bonds which are offered and sold in the United States in reliance on Rule 144A (the "Restricted Bonds") will initially
be represented by beneficial interests in one or more global Bonds for each series of Bonds (the "Restricted Global Bonds"), in registered form, without
interest coupons attached, which will be deposited on or about the Closing Date with Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as custodian (the
"Custodian") for, and registered in the name of Cede & Co. as nominee of, The Depository Trust Company ("DTC"). Interests in the Restricted Global
Bonds will be subject to certain restrictions on transfer. See "The Global Bonds--Transfers". Beneficial interests in the Unrestricted Global Bonds and the
Restricted Global Bonds (together, the "Global Bonds") will be shown on, and transfers thereof will be effected only through, records maintained by
DTC, Euroclear and Clearstream, Luxembourg and their participants. Except as described herein, individual definitive certificates for Bonds will not be
issued in exchange for beneficial interests in the Global Bonds.
As to the 2025 Bonds and the 2030 Bonds
Joint Lead Managers and Joint Bookrunners
Barclays
Crédit Agricole CIB
Deutsche Bank
J.P. Morgan
QNB Capital
Standard Chartered Bank

UBS Investment Bank

As to the 2050 Bonds
Joint Bookrunning Managers
Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment
Deutsche Bank AG, Taipei Branch
Standard Chartered Bank (Taiwan Limited)
Bank, Taipei Branch
(Lead Manager)

Structuring Agents
Barclays
J.P. Morgan
QNB Capital

UBS Investment Bank

Prospectus dated April 8, 2020

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RISK FACTORS .................................................................................................................................... 1
RESPONSIBILITY STATEMENT ...................................................................................................... 13
IMPORTANT NOTICE ........................................................................................................................ 14
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................... 16
NOTICE TO QATARI RESIDENTS ................................................................................................... 33
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITIES ....................................................................................... 34
PRESENTATION OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION ....................................................................... 36
PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN RESERVES INFORMATION ....................................................... 37
PRESENTATION OF HYDROCARBON DATA ............................................................................... 38
PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN OTHER DATA RELATED TO QATAR ...................................... 39
DISCLOSURE REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS .......................................... 41
USE OF PROCEEDS ........................................................................................................................... 42
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF QATAR ........................................................................................ 43
THE ECONOMY OF QATAR ............................................................................................................. 60
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM ..................................................................................... 100
PUBLIC FINANCE ............................................................................................................................ 115
INDEBTEDNESS ............................................................................................................................... 125
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ............................................................................................................. 131
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE BONDS ............................................................................... 140
THE GLOBAL BONDS ..................................................................................................................... 169
CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT .................................................................................................... 172
TAXATION ........................................................................................................................................ 177
SUBSCRIPTION AND SALE ........................................................................................................... 183
TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS ........................................................................................................... 187
GENERAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................................. 189
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RISK FACTORS
The purchase of the Bonds involves substantial risk and is suitable only for, and should be made only
by, investors that are fully familiar with the State in general and that have such other knowledge and
experience in financial, business and foreign currency matters as may enable them to evaluate the
risks and merits of an investment in the Bonds. Prior to making an investment decision, prospective
investors should consider carefully, in light of their own financial circumstances and investment
objectives, all the information set forth herein and, in particular, the risk factors set forth below.
Prospective investors in the Bonds should make such inquiries as they think appropriate regarding
the Bonds and the State.
Risks Relating to Qatar
Investing in securities involving emerging markets, such as Qatar, generally involves a higher
degree of risk.
Investing in securities involving emerging markets, such as Qatar, generally involves a higher degree
of risk than investments in securities of issuers from more developed countries. Investors should also
note that emerging markets such as Qatar are subject to rapid change and that the information set forth
in this Prospectus may become outdated relatively quickly. Moreover, financial turmoil in any one
emerging market country tends to demonstrate a contagion effect, in which an entire region or class of
investment is disfavored by international investors. Therefore, Qatar could be adversely affected by
negative economic or financial developments in other emerging market countries. As has happened in
the past, financial problems or an increase in the perceived risks associated with investing in emerging
economies could dampen foreign investment in Qatar and adversely affect its economy. Other higher
risks relating to emerging markets such as Qatar include, but are not limited to governmental
intervention, including expropriation or nationalization of assets or increased levels of protectionism;
increased governmental regulations, or adverse governmental activities, with respect to price, import
and export controls, the environment, customs and immigration, capital transfers, foreign exchange
and currency controls, labor policies and land and water use and foreign ownership; arbitrary,
inconsistent or unlawful government action; changing tax regimes, including the imposition or
increase of taxes; and difficulties and delays in obtaining governmental and other approvals for
operations or renewing existing ones. There can be no assurance that the market for securities bearing
emerging market risk, such as the Bonds, will not be affected negatively by events elsewhere,
especially in emerging markets.
The fluctuations in hydrocarbon prices have impacted the State's revenues and its financial
condition and may continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
Oil
Despite ongoing diversification efforts, the State's revenues are significantly affected by international
oil and natural gas prices, which have fluctuated significantly over the past two decades. International
prices for crude oil have fluctuated substantially as a result of many factors, including global demand
for oil and natural gas, factors which affect available supplies, such as the ability or willingness of the
OPEC and non-OPEC countries, such as Russia, to set and maintain oil production levels, changes in
governmental regulations and international relations, weather, general economic conditions and
competition from other energy sources.
World oil prices had recovered from the lows of U.S.$43.32 (monthly Europe Brent Spot Price FOB)
per barrel witnessed in February 2009, in the wake of the global economic crisis, generally averaging
between U.S.$95 and U.S.$125 per barrel (monthly Europe Brent Spot Price FOB) for most of 2011
to 2013 and for the first three quarters of 2014. However, in October 2014, crude oil prices began to
fall sharply, reaching U.S.$38.01 per barrel in December 2015 (monthly Europe Brent Spot Price
FOB) and U.S.$30.70 per barrel in January 2016 (monthly Europe Brent Spot Price FOB). The price
of crude oil has recovered since early 2016 and increased to U.S.$53.31 per barrel in December 2016
(monthly Europe Brent Spot Price FOB) and U.S.$64.37 per barrel in December 2017 (monthly
1

Europe Brent Spot Price FOB) and then decreased to U.S.$57.36 in December 2018 (monthly Europe
Brent Spot Price FOB). Since January 2020, the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak and fear of further
spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) have caused significant disruptions in international economies and
international financial and oil markets, including a substantial decline in the price of oil. On March 9,
2020, the price of oil fell approximately 20% due to a dispute over production levels between Russia
and Saudi Arabia, as a result of which Saudi Arabia has increased its production to record levels. As
at March 30, 2020, the price of crude oil was U.S.$19.07 per barrel (Europe Brent Spot Price FOB).
There can be no assurance that oil prices will return to the higher prices seen in previous years or that
prices will not decrease again in the future.
Natural Gas and Petrochemicals
Furthermore, as crude oil prices provide a benchmark for gas and petrochemical feedstock prices,
changes in crude oil prices have also had an impact on gas and petrochemical prices. International
prices for natural gas have fluctuated significantly in the past depending on global supply and demand
and the availability and price of alternative energy sources. The development of fracking technology
in the United States has increased both United States gas reserves and gas production, which has led
to depressed gas prices in the United States and a divergence of those gas prices from prices in Asia
and Europe. Qatar's ability to benefit from higher Asian and European gas prices may be negatively
affected by a number of LNG projects that have come or are expected to come on stream in the next
several years that will significantly increase the supply of LNG, including large LNG projects in
Australia and Mozambique, which are close to the Asian market and, consequently, any surplus
delivered to the Asian market may negatively impact the Asian gas market. This, together with other
factors such as a global economic downturn, could put further downward pressure on natural gas
prices.
Limitations on Increased Production
In the past, Qatar was able to partially offset lower hydrocarbon prices by increases in hydrocarbon
production but, in recent years, hydrocarbon production has also decreased. Production of crude oil
and condensates decreased in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Production of LNG decreased in 2019, but
remained virtually unchanged in 2018 when compared to 2017. In addition, most of Qatar's oilfields
are mature and oil production may have peaked in 2010. Qatar has reached the end of a 20-year
development cycle for LNG projects and LNG production has plateaued. With a moratorium on the
development of new gas projects in the North Field that had been in place since 2005 and only lifted
in April 2017, and given the long lead time to develop gas projects, Qatar may not be able to
significantly increase gas production in the near future through new gas projects.
QP, which manages the State's interests in all oil, gas, petrochemical and refining enterprises in Qatar
and abroad, does not currently engage in hedging activities to mitigate against fluctuations in
hydrocarbon prices and, accordingly, the recent material decrease in hydrocarbon prices has affected
the financial condition of the State and any further decrease may continue to do so.
Continued low hydrocarbon production and any material reduction in the prices of natural gas, crude
oil and other hydrocarbons will have a significant impact on the value of the State's reserves and may
materially adversely impact the State's revenues and the financial condition of the State.
Lower hydrocarbon revenues may affect the ability of the State to invest in and diversify its
economy.
Although international prices for hydrocarbon products have recovered slightly in recent years, the
prevailing low oil prices continue to have a significant adverse effect on the oil revenue dependent
GCC economies, resulting in reduced fiscal budgets and public spending plans for 2016 and 2017,
together with increased budgetary deficits across the GCC.
In Qatar, lower hydrocarbon prices in recent years have had a significant impact on the State's
revenues and the financial condition of the State. Revenues from oil and gas were QR173,129 million
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(U.S.$47,563 million) for the year ended December 31, 2018, QR132,988 million (U.S.$36,535
million) for the year ended December 31, 2017 and QR140,717 million (U.S.$38,659 million) for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2016. According to preliminary data, revenues from oil and gas were
QR129,295 million (U.S.$35,520 million) for the nine months ended September 30, 2019.
The oil and gas sector contributed 83.3%, 81.5% and 82.7% to total revenues in the years ended
December 31, 2018, 2017 and 2016, respectively. The oil and gas sector contributed 34.0%, 36.9%,
32.3%, 29.7% and 37.5% to Qatar's total nominal GDP for the years ended December 31, 2019, 2018,
2017, 2016 and 2015, respectively. This decreasing contribution of the oil and gas sector between
2015 and 2018 was primarily due to the decrease in hydrocarbon prices and the continued
diversification of the economy, particularly in the services and construction sectors.
In the past, the State has used hydrocarbon revenues to invest in its economy, including through
increased public sector wages, investment in downstream oil and gas projects and in non-hydrocarbon
areas such as construction. Lower hydrocarbon revenue adversely affects the State's ability to
continue to invest in these areas of its economy at the same level. Beginning in 2015, Qatar started to
incur budget deficits and turned to deficit financing, including the issuance of bonds, as one way of
continuing its investments in its economy. There can be no guarantee that the State can continue to
raise debt financing in the future to finance projected deficits at either the same cost of funds or in
similar amounts.
If lower current hydrocarbon revenues are sustained or become worse for an extended period, this will
have a significant adverse effect on Qatar's economy, which in turn could adversely impact the
capacity of the State to implement its economic investment and diversification programs. The
combination of both lower hydrocarbon revenues and potentially lower revenues from non-
hydrocarbon sources as a result of lower investments would adversely affect the State's financial
condition.
Qatar's efforts to further diversify its economy may not be successful.
Qatar's economy remains dependent on hydrocarbons, though the Government has been working
towards diversifying the economy in recent years. The Qatar National Vision 2030 is a comprehensive
economic vision that outlines a path for the future development of Qatar's economy and is based on
shifting Qatar's economy from a hydrocarbon-driven economy to a global diversified economy.
However, there can be no assurance that Qatar's efforts to diversify its economy and reduce its
dependence on hydrocarbons will be successful. A failure to diversify the economy would make the
economy more susceptible to the risks associated with the sectors in which the economy is
concentrated and any downturn in such sectors could result in the slowdown of the entire economy
which, in turn, could have an adverse effect on the economic and financial condition of Qatar.
Any further economic downturn may have an impact on the financial condition of Qatar, including
the financial sector.
Following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, financial markets in the United States, Europe and
Asia experienced a period of unprecedented turmoil and upheaval characterized by extreme volatility
and declines in security prices, severely diminished liquidity and credit availability, inability to access
capital markets, the bankruptcy, failure, collapse or sale of various financial institutions and an
unprecedented level of intervention from the United States government and other governments. These
circumstances were further exacerbated by the deteriorating economic situation in certain European
countries during this period, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, among others, political
instability, turmoil and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa region and natural disasters and
other catastrophic events. More recently, capital flight from emerging markets has led to tighter
financial conditions in a number of countries, including some countries in the Middle East and North
Africa region.
These deteriorating economic conditions resulted in the State providing financial support to Qatar's
banking sector by making equity and other investments in domestic commercial banks. Although
3

macroeconomic indicators have improved since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, and the State's
policies have generally resulted in improved economic performance in Qatar, there can be no
assurance that such level of performance will be sustained. In addition, should there be a further
deterioration in economic conditions in the Middle East and North Africa region, including Qatar, the
State may find it necessary to assume responsibility for the financial liabilities of both State-owned
and non-State-owned enterprises in Qatar, which are not currently reflected as either the direct or
contingent liabilities of the State. Any such intervention by the State could materially adversely affect
the economy and financial condition of the State, and expose the State to additional liabilities.
Furthermore, while oil prices have recovered since early 2016, if a lower oil price environment is
sustained for an extended period, the capacity of the State to support enterprises in Qatar could be
eroded somewhat. Additionally, this could adversely impact the capacity of the State to implement its
infrastructure investment program, which could lead to lower than expected medium-term growth.
The worldwide economic effects of the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) could adversely
affect Qatar's economy.
In December 2019, the emergence of a new strain of the coronavirus (COVID-19) was reported in
Wuhan, Hubei Province, China that has subsequently spread throughout the world, including Qatar.
On January 30, 2020 the World Health Organization declared coronavirus (COVID-19) a public
health emergency of international concern and on March 11, 2020 the World Health Organization
declared coronavirus (COVID-19) a global pandemic. The coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak is
currently having an adverse impact on the global economy, the severity and duration of which is
difficult to predict. Qatar has implemented restrictions to prevent the spread of coronavirus (COVID-
19). These measures have included restricting travel into Qatar from certain countries, suspending
non-essential businesses, banning public gatherings and closing down schools and universities.
Currently the trajectory of the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak remains highly uncertain and we
cannot predict the duration, severity or effect of the pandemic or any future containment efforts.
However, there is a risk that the spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) and the measures taken to contain
its spread may continue to have adverse effects on Qatar's economy and financial markets, including
an economic recession.

The future revenues of the State may be negatively impacted if QP and its joint ventures are unable
to deliver LNG or natural gas under their long term sale and purchase agreements.
Certain of QP's joint ventures have entered into long term sale and purchase agreements for the
supply of LNG or natural gas to third parties. If any of QP's drilling, shipping or other transportation
activities were to permanently cease to operate or be interrupted in the future, for reasons other than
force majeure, these joint ventures may be exposed to significant contractual liabilities, which may
negatively impact QP's financial condition and results of operations and, accordingly, the revenues of
the State. Any such interruption in the supply of LNG or natural gas could materially adversely affect
the revenues to the State generated by QP, thereby impacting the ability of the State to finance its
obligations.
The future revenues of the State may be negatively impacted if joint venture projects in which state
owned entities have provided completion guarantees are delayed or cancelled.
If any joint venture project in which QP or another state owned entity has provided a completion
guarantee is delayed or cancelled with the result that the guarantee is called, this may negatively
impact the financial condition and results of operations of the relevant entity and, accordingly, the
revenues of the State.
The production, processing, storage and shipping of hydrocarbons in Qatar subjects the State and
QP to risks associated with hazardous materials.
The oil and gas sector in Qatar consists of both upstream and downstream activities which include the
production, processing, storage and shipping of oil, natural gas, petrochemicals and other
4

hydrocarbons in various physical states. Hydrocarbons, by their nature, are often hazardous materials
which have the potential to harm or damage property, production facilities, people and the
environment. A disaster involving hydrocarbons, such as an oil spill, could have a materially adverse
effect on the revenues or assets of QP or the State, either from direct losses, such as the loss of export
revenue, the loss of tax revenue or liability to third parties or from indirect losses, such as unrecovered
clean-up costs from third parties or unmitigated environmental damage. Although Qatar has not
experienced a significant disaster involving hydrocarbons, the State cannot guarantee that such an
event will not occur in the future.
The State is located in a region that is subject to ongoing geopolitical, political and security
concerns, and the State has recently been subject to a blockade by four GCC countries.
Although Qatar has historically enjoyed domestic political stability and good international relations,
Qatar is located in a region that is strategically important and parts of this region are experiencing or
have, at times, experienced political instability, geopolitical and diplomatic tensions, domestic turmoil
and violence, and armed conflict. For example, there have been significant political changes in
Tunisia and Egypt, armed conflicts in Iraq, Libya and Syria, an ongoing civil war in Yemen, an
escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the multinational conflict with the Islamic State,
and protests and related activities in a number of other countries in the region. These recent and
ongoing developments, along with terrorist acts, acts of maritime piracy and other forms of instability
in the region, that may or may not directly involve Qatar, could have a material adverse effect on
Qatar's economy, including an effect on Qatar's ability to engage in international trade and
destabilizing effects on the oil and gas market. QP and its subsidiaries rely heavily on the ability to
send and receive ships through the Straits of Hormuz and any closure of the Strait of Hormuz may
have an adverse impact on GCC countries, including Qatar.
Relations between Qatar and certain of its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa region
have recently become more strained. On June 5, 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates (the "Quartet") took steps to cut trade, transport and diplomatic ties with Qatar (the
"Quartet Blockade"). The measures adopted included a sudden and unprecedented closure of sea and
air routes with Qatar and a closure of the land border between Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Qatar's only
land border), which created logistical challenges for Qatar. The blockade disrupted historical trade
routes that Qatar has depended on for the import of key consumer goods, food staples and industrial
materials. As part of the Quartet Blockade, Qatari officials and diplomats were expelled from the
Quartet countries. Qatari citizens were also expelled from the Quartet countries (other than Egypt),
and citizens of the Quartet countries (other than Egypt) were forbidden by the Quartet countries from
remaining in Qatar. Certain other countries, primarily in North Africa but also including Jordan and
Yemen, also severed or reduced diplomatic relations with Qatar. Additionally, the Quartet Blockade
placed significant pressure on Qatar's financial system and the Qatari riyal, leading, among other
things, to significant outflows from non-resident and private sector customer deposits and a fall in
Qatar's foreign currency reserves in its aftermath. Immediately following the imposition of the
Quartet Blockade, deposits amounting to nearly U.S.$20 billion were withdrawn from the Qatari
banking system. Although the Government has undertaken a number of measures to counter the
effects of the Quartet Blockade, additional pressures could build up in the future and there can be no
assurance that such measures will be sufficient to adequately offset the economic, social or fiscal
impact that the Quartet Blockade may have on Qatar in the future. The economic, social and fiscal
impact of the Quartet Blockade on Qatar remains uncertain and it is unclear if the matter will be
resolved in the near-term. Prolonged uncertainty may negatively affect business and investor
confidence, which may reduce foreign investment and economic growth in Qatar. Furthermore,
disruptions to trade and transport links could impact the implementation of key infrastructure projects
and delay Qatar's long-term diversification plans. See "Overview of the State of Qatar Foreign
Relations Regional Relations" and "Economy The Quartet Blockade and Qatar's Response".
Additionally, Qatar is dependent on expatriate workforce, ranging from unskilled laborers to highly
skilled professionals in several industry sectors. Should regional instability increase or foreign
militants commence operations in Qatar, this could materially decrease the availability of expatriate
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labor with appropriate skills, which could negatively impact Qatar's economy as a whole as the
continued availability of skilled labor is an important aspect of the Qatar National Vision 2030. In
addition, as the Government continues to diversify Qatar's economy into other sectors, the country's
exposure to broader regional and global economic trends or geopolitical developments may increase.
An escalation of the Quartet Blockade, or any deterioration in relations or deepening instability
elsewhere in the region, should it materialize, could adversely impact Qatar and broader regional
security and may have a material adverse effect on Qatar's economy.
Prior to 2009, Qatar had a high rate of inflation which was caused, in part, by the failure of
domestic real estate supply to meet levels of demand and a return of high rates of inflation in the
future could adversely affect the economy.
Prior to 2009, Qatar had high levels of inflation and the overall annual inflation rate was 15.2%,
13.6% and 11.8% in 2008, 2007 and 2006, respectively. The high levels of inflation prior to 2009
were primarily accounted for by the rapid and sustained increase in real estate prices, as well as an
increase in international food and raw material prices. In 2009 and 2010, inflation rates were negative
as a result of the decrease in housing costs. In 2011, Qatar made an exit from the deflation phase of
the previous two years by recording positive inflation of 1.9%. In 2012, 2013 and 2014, consumer
price inflation continued to increase, with the general index increasing by 2.32%, 3.20% and 3.36%,
respectively and this was in contrast to global trends where inflation pressures eased considerably,
especially in advanced economies. There can be no assurance that Qatar will not be subject to much
higher inflation rates in the future. In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the consumer price inflation was 0.40%,
0.34% and (0.90%), respectively.
Although the Government and the QCB can use various monetary instruments to address price
stability, including moving interest rates independently of the U.S. Federal Reserve despite the
currency peg, there can be no guarantee that the Government or the QCB will be able to achieve or
maintain price stability and thus control inflation. If Qatar were to face high rates of inflation in the
future, this could adversely affect its economy.
The statistical data contained in this Prospectus should be treated with caution by prospective
investors.
Statistics contained in this Prospectus, including those in relation to nominal GDP, balance of
payments, revenues and expenditure, and indebtedness of the Government, have been obtained from,
among others, the Ministry of Finance, QP, the QCB and the Planning and Statistics Authority. Such
statistics, and the component data on which they are based, may be unreliable and may not have been
compiled in the same manner as data provided by similar sources in Western Europe and the
United States. Similar statistics may be obtainable from other sources, although the underlying
assumptions and methodology and, consequently, the resulting data, may vary from source to source.
There may also be material variances between preliminary or estimated statistical data set forth in this
Prospectus and actual results, and between the statistical data set forth in this Prospectus and
corresponding data previously published, or published in the future, by or on behalf of Qatar. In
addition, due to deficiencies in the currency of certain data, some statistical information for recent
years is not available as of the date of this Prospectus. Consequently, the statistical data contained in
this Prospectus should be treated with caution by prospective investors.
Information on hydrocarbon reserves is based on estimates that have not been reviewed by an
independent consultant for the purposes of this offering.
The information on oil, gas and other reserves contained in this Prospectus is based on an annual
review of reserves compiled by QP as of December 31, 2018. Neither the State nor the Banks have
engaged an independent consultant or any other person to conduct a review of Qatar's natural gas or
crude oil reserves in connection with this offering. All reserve estimates presented herein are based on
data maintained by QP.
6

Reserves valuation is a subjective process of estimating underground accumulations of crude oil and
natural gas that cannot be measured in an exact manner. The accuracy of any reserve estimate depends
on the quality and reliability of available data, engineering and geological interpretations and
subjective judgment. Additionally, estimates may be revised based on subsequent results of drilling,
testing and production. The proportion of reserves that can ultimately be produced, the rate of
production and the costs of developing the fields are difficult to estimate and, therefore, the reserve
estimates may differ materially from the ultimately recoverable quantities of crude oil and natural gas.
Any alteration to, or abolition of, the foreign exchange "peg" of the Qatari riyal or other regional
currencies at a fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar could lead to a devaluation of the Qatari riyal
against the U.S. dollar and could adversely impact the banking system in Qatar and across the
wider GCC region.
Since 1980, the peg has been effectively set at a fixed exchange rate of 3.64 riyals per U.S. dollar and
this rate was officially adopted in 2001. The following oil producing GCC countries also have their
currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar as at the date of this Prospectus: the UAE; Saudi Arabia; the
Sultanate of Oman; and Bahrain. In response to the ongoing volatility of oil price internationally, oil
producing countries with currencies that have been traditionally pegged to the U.S. dollar have faced
pressure to de-peg and, in certain cases, have de-pegged their currencies. For example, Kazakhstan
de-pegged the Kazakhstani tenge from the U.S. dollar on August 20, 2015, which was followed on
December 21, 2015 by the removal of the U.S. dollar peg against the Azerbaijani manat. There is a
risk that, in response to the continuing oil price crisis, additional countries may choose to unwind their
existing currency peg to the U.S. dollar, both in the GCC and the wider region.
Any future de-pegging by the GCC states, in the event that the current challenging market conditions
persist for a prolonged period, would pose a systemic risk to the regional banking systems due to the
devaluation of any de-pegged currency against the U.S. dollar and the impact this would have on the
open cross currency positions held by regional banks. Given the levels of exposure amongst regional
financial institutions to other pegged currencies, it is also likely that such currency de-valuation(s)
would adversely impact the banking systems in Qatar and across the wider GCC.
Any such de-pegging either in Qatar or across the wider region could affect Qatar's ability to perform
its obligations in respect of the Bonds.
Credit ratings may not reflect all risks.
In 2017, Moody's, S&P and Fitch downgraded Qatar's rating to Aa3, AA- and AA-, respectively.
Each rating agency also changed the sovereign's outlook to negative in 2017, citing Qatar's economic
and financial risks and the ongoing recent events affecting regional relations as the primary reason for
its rating downgrade. In 2018, each rating agency affirmed its rating, and changed Qatar's outlook to
stable. In 2020, Moody's, S&P and Fitch affirmed Qatar's rating and stable outlook.
Any downgrade or negative change in outlook in Qatar's sovereign credit rating (whether solicited or
unsolicited), or in the credit ratings of instruments issued, insured or guaranteed by related institutions
or agencies, could negatively affect the price of the Bonds and could have a material adverse effect on
Qatar's cost of borrowing and could limit its access to debt capital markets.
The credit ratings included or referred to in this Prospectus will be treated for the purposes of the
CRA Regulation as having been issued by S&P, Fitch and Moody's. Each of S&P, Fitch and Moody's
is established in the European Union and is registered under the CRA Regulation. Each of these
agencies is included in the list of credit rating agencies published by the European Securities and
Markets Authority on its website (http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/List-registered-and-certified-
CRAs) in accordance with the CRA Regulation.
A credit rating is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold the Bonds. Credit ratings are subject to
revisions or withdrawal at any time by the assigning rating agency. The State cannot be certain that a
credit rating will remain for any given period of time or that a credit rating will not be downgraded or
7